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Terrorism: Aliens' Freedom of Speech and
Association Under Attack in the United States
Aubrey Glover
"He's a Palestinian, not a U.S citizen but a legal resident,
never charged with a crime, but suspected of terrorism."'
"[T]hey distributed magazines, passed out leaflets and organ-
ized fund-raising dinners where national anthems were sung,
poetry was read and money was raised for hospitals and
schools. They even demonstrated in public plazas on occasion,
carrying signs that criticized the actions of the U.S. govern-
ment and other foreign governments. '
I. INTRODUCTION
Although not convicted of any crimes, aliens who have engaged
in speech and association with unpopular groups, specifically
those linked with terrorism, have increasingly been deported or
have been threatened with deportation proceedings.3  Many of
these aliens engaged in conduct protected by the First Amend-
ment but were placed into proceedings to remove them from the
United States because this conduct was linked to groups the
United States Government labeled terrorist groups.4 Based on
current cases, it appears that aliens may be removed from the
United States for exercising rights that would be protected by the
First Amendment if the person were a United States citizen. This
1. Ben Feller, Professor Joins Defenders In Job Fight, THE TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 15, 2002,
at Nation/World 1, available at 2002 WL 6538276. Professor Sami Al-Arian is a permanent
resident of the United States who is Palestinian. He is suspected of supporting terrorism
and has been a supporter of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Michael Fechter & Ben Feller,
Al-Arian History Linked to USF Since 1986, THE TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 21, 2002 at 10, avail-
able at 2002 WL 26170736. During February of 2003, Professor Al-Arian was arrested and
charged with a fifty count indictment, including financing a terrorist group. Eric Boehlert,
Is Sami Al-Arian Guilty of Terrorist Plots?, Salon.com, Feb. 21, 2003, available at
http://archive.salon.connews/feature/2003/02/21al-arian/indexnp.html.
2. Jeanne A. Butterfield, Immigrants' Rights Come Under Fire in 'the Land of the
Free', SEArrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 2, 1999, available at http://www.aila.org. (In
response to Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999)).
3. 8 U.S.C §1189 (2002). (This section of the immigration law describes the process of
designating an organization as "terrorist" for immigration purposes.).
4. See supra note 2.
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raises serious questions. First, does the First Amendment protect
aliens who are in the United States? Second, if the First Amend-
ment does protect these aliens, does it protect them in the context
of deportation/removal proceedings? Third, do the grounds of de-
portation for terrorism violate the First Amendment rights of law-
fully admitted aliens?5 Fourth, if aliens' rights are violated, what
can be done to correct the ground of deportation so that it complies
with the First Amendment? This comment concludes that aliens
have rights under the First Amendment that are violated by the
current grounds of deportation for terrorism. It will provide sug-
gestions to revise the grounds of deportation and other sections of
the Immigration and Nationality Act6 in such a way to achieve the
goal of deporting terrorists without violating the First Amend-
ment rights of aliens.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES PROTECT THE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATIONS OF ALIENS PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES.
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee.7 This decision followed twelve
years of litigation between the Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice ("INS")8 and eight aliens claiming they were targeted for de-
portation because of their political beliefs and associations in vio-
lation of their First Amendment rights.9 Justice Scalia, for the
majority, held that changes in the immigration law in 1996 "de-
prive[d] the federal courts of jurisdiction over respondents'
5. This comment specifically focuses on the rights of aliens lawfully present in the
United States. However, aliens unlawfully present likely have similar rights. "A state is
obligated to respect the human rights of persons subject to its jurisdiction." Beharry v.
Reno, 183 F.Supp.2d 584, 587-8 (E.D. N.Y. 2002) (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 701, 722 (1986)). "An alien in the United States is entitled to
the guarantees of the United States Constitution other than those expressly reserved for
citizens." Id. at 587-88. So at least one federal court has recognized that, in some cases,
the rights of aliens are not distinguishable on the basis of their legal status. One major
difference, though, is that aliens unlawfully present in the United States are deportable
under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(1)(B) (2002).
6. The Immigration and Nationality Act, with its amendments, is codified in 8 U.S.C.
1 et seq.
7. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
8. The Immigration & Naturalization Service is the federal agency responsible for
administering the immigration and nationality laws of the United States. The agency will
be referred to by its abbreviation of INS for the rest of this paper. However, note that as of
February 28, 2003, INS no longer exists. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). The deportation function is now handled by the Bureau of Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement. Id.
9. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. at 473.
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claims."" Many have assumed this decision means that aliens are
without the protection of the First Amendment." However, the
Court never stated that aliens' speech and associations lacked the
protection of the First Amendment. 2 Instead, it determined the
method used to reach the Court was no longer valid so it lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case; the Court left the door open for chal-
lenges using habeas review." Unfortunately, this decision did va-
cate the prior decisions in which the eight aliens had succeeded. 4
But it did not vacate the case law relied upon in those decisions.
One decision relied upon by the vacated lower court decisions
was Bridges v. California.5 In 1941, the United States Supreme
Court reversed a state court's contempt conviction of Harry
Bridges. 6 Although Bridges was an alien, 7 the Court never ques-
tioned whether, because of his alienage, his rights were different
from a citizen's rights under the First Amendment. Rather, the
Court treated him the same as any citizen whose rights were vio-
lated. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter took excep-
tion to the fact that the majority did not address Bridges'
alienage."8 According to Justice Frankfurter, "only the Due Proc-
ess Clause assures constitutional protection of civil liberties to
aliens and corporations."' 9 Despite this criticism, Bridges v. Cali-
fornia has been cited as acknowledging that lawfully admitted
10. Id. at 492.
11. David G. Savage, Deportation Must Go On: Aliens Can't Stop INS Ouster With
Constitutional Claim, 85 A.B.A.J. 38 (1999); David Cole, Supreme Court Denies First
Amendment Rights To Legal Aliens, LEGAL TIMES, March 8, 1999; Jeanne A. Butterfield,
supra note 2.
12. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. at 488. Justice Scalia did
state: "As a general matter-and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put for-
ward in the present case-an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to
assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation." Id.
13. Id. at 480. See also David G. Savage, supra note 11.
14. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. at 492.
15. 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ("Bridges I").
16. Bridges 1, 314 U.S. at 278. As a motion for a new trial was pending in a case involv-
ing the union that Bridges was an officer of, he sent a telegram that was published to the
Secretary of Labor warning that the port of Los Angeles would be "tied up" because of the
state court judge's decision. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 277-76 (1941). As a result, Bridges was
convicted for his comments. Id. at 277. California tried to justify its actions by arguing that
because of its obligation to administer justice, it was necessary to take action to ensure
judicial trials were fair and free from coercion or intimidation. Id. at 259.
17. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 137 (1945) ("Bridges I").





aliens possess First Amendment right. ° The decision has not since
been overruled.
In a second case before the Court involving Harry Bridges, the
Court stated, "Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens
residing in this country."2' Leading up to this case, deportation
proceedings were instituted against Bridges because of his alleged
membership and his alleged affiliation with the Communist
party." The Court determined that the meaning of affiliation re-
lied on by the government was too broad.2 The Court interpreted
affiliation to mean "that quality which indicates an adherence to
or a furtherance of the purposes or objectives of the proscribed
organization as distinguished from mere cooperation with its law-
ful activities.2 4 The government failed to prove that Bridges had
done anything beyond cooperating with the Communist party's
lawful activities, 5 thereby holding that these activities were pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 6 Moreover, Bridges' alleged
membership in the Communist party also was not proven. The
government had relied on the same evidence that was too weak to
prove affiliation with the Communist party." The Court had al-
ready determined that affiliation was less than membership. 8
Therefore the evidence used against Bridges was insufficient to
render him deportable for being a member of the Communist
party.
Six years later, in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy," the Court up-
held an order of deportation against Harisiades, a Greek national
who had been a member of the Communist party.0 The actual
question decided in this case was whether a resident alien could
legally be deported based on membership in the Communist party,
when said membership ended prior to enactment of the law which
20. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 599 (1952) (Douglas, J., and Black, J.,
dissenting); Bridges, 326 U.S. at 148; American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v.
Meese, 714 F.Supp. 1060, 1074 (1989). These are just a couple of examples.
21. Bridges 11, 326 U.S. at 148 (citing Bridges I, 314 U.S. at 252).
22. Id. at 138-39.
23. Id. at 149.
24. Id. at 143-44.
25. Id. at 145-46. At this time, the Communist party was alleged to advocate the over-
throw of the government by force. The evidence used against Bridges only linked him to
lawful activities based upon his position in the Marine Workers Industrial Union. Id.
26. Bridges 11, 326 U.S. at 148.
27. Id. at 149-50.
28. Id. at 143.
29. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
30. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 581.
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provided the ground for deportation.3' One argument put forth by
Harisiades was that by joining the Communist party, an alien
only exercised his or her freedom of speech and assembly as pro-
tected by the First Amendment.3' The Court rejected this argu-
ment because Congress was allowed to distinguish between groups
advocating peaceful change from those advocating change through
violence, like the Communist party.33 Relying on Dennis v. United
States,34 the Court concluded that allowing the deportation of
Harisiades did not violate his First Amendment rights.35
Aliens and their advocates alike believed that the decision in
Harisiades meant that the First Amendment did not protect the
speech and associations of legal aliens.36 This was similar to the
reaction of some commentators following Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee." This belief was, however, un-
founded.38 For the majority, Justice Jackson determined that
aliens' First Amendment rights were not violated.39 This conclu-
sion was reached after the Court applied the same test it used to
determine whether criminal statutes violated United States citi-
zens' rights. ° Justice Jackson never suggested that aliens lacked
the same rights." In fact, one can argue that aliens' First
Amendment rights were afforded the same level of protection as
the rights of United States citizens.
In subsequent cases to Harisiades and Bridges, the Court has
further reinforced the fact that aliens have protected rights under
the First Amendment. In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,2 a perma-
nent resident alien returning from abroad was excluded from re-
entering the United States. 3 Chew contested his exclusion, and
the Court found that because Chew was a permanent resident
31. Id. at 581.
32. Id. at 591-92.
33. Id. at 592.
34. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
35. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592.
36. See also American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 714 F.Supp. at 1077 n.12
(citing Legomsky, Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and America
202-05 (1987)); Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resi-
dent Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 Yale L.J. 262, 285 n. 153 (1959)).
37. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 Am.
J. Int'l L. 862, 869 n.42 (1989).
38. Id. at 869.
39. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592.
40. Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 868.
41. Id.
42. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
43. Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 592.
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alien, he was entitled to due process, such as notice of the charge
against him.4  The Court distinguished between returning per-
manent resident aliens and aliens attempting to enter the United
States for the very first time.45 Aliens attempting to enter for the
first time did not have protection under the Bill of Rights;4 the
returning resident alien, however, was "invested with the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders.
Such rights include those protected by the First and Fifth
Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. None of these provisions acknowledge any distinc-
tion between citizens and resident aliens."'
The Supreme Court, therefore, has acknowledged that aliens
possess rights under the First Amendment. The text of the Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights provide support for the conclusion
that aliens should have the same First Amendment rights as any
citizen. In fact, where not explicitly provided for under the Con-
stitution, aliens generally enjoy the same rights as citizens. There
are several provisions within the Constitution where the framers
elected to treat citizens differently than aliens. As a precondition
to being elected to the House or Senate of Congress, those seeking
election were required to be United States citizens for a certain
length of time." To be eligible for the presidency of the United
States, not only is the person required to be a United States citi-
zen, he or she must have been born a United States citizen.49 An-
ticipating that some aliens in the United States would choose to
become citizens, Congress was given the task of establishing "an
uniform rule for naturalization.""
If the framers specifically distinguished between aliens and citi-
zens in the Constitution, the same could have been done within
the Bill of Rights. Instead, the first eight amendments refer to a
"person,"51 the "right of the people,"52 and the "accused."53 It can
still be debated, of course, who "the people" are.54 The Court has
44. Id. at 595-96.
45. Id. at 596.
46. Id. at 596-97 n.5. (The Court quotes extensively from Bridges v. Wixon.).
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3.
49. Id. at art. II, §1.
50. Id. at art. I, §8.
51. Id. at amend. V.
52. Id. at amend. I, II, and IV.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
54. U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-67 (1990).
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determined that this is a term of art and has suggested that the
term "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national com-
munity or who have otherwise developed sufficient connections
with this country to be considered part of that community."
Aliens who are lawfully admitted have become a part of the na-
tional community and, depending on whether they are permanent
residents or only temporarily residing in the United States, have
developed sufficient connections to be considered a part of this
nation. Further, at least one of the founding fathers, James Madi-
son, held the belief that aliens should receive protection under the
Bill of Rights. 6 Madison stated, "As [aliens] owe, on one hand, a
temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protec-
tion and advantage."57
Further proof can be found in the First Amendment itself. That
amendment states: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech.""8 The Amendment does not require the
speaker to be a citizen to receive its protection. It does not pro-
vide, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech" of United States citizens. The First Amendment values
speech, regardless of the source.
Examining three of the several philosophical explanations for
free expression, specifically the marketplace of ideas, 9 self-
60 6governance, and self-realization,' one finds nothing within these
concepts that excludes aliens from participating in free expression.
The first rationale for free expression, known as the search for the
truth within the marketplace of ideas, is that "the best test of the
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market."2 Since there is no way to know for certain
what is true and false within the marketplace of ideas, it is in the
55. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
56. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1065 (1995).
57. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in 4 JONATHAN
ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 556 (1907), cited within American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 70 F.3d at 1065 (1995).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
60. Thomas Irwin Emerson, Toward A General Theory Of The First Amendment, 72
Yale L. J. 877, 882 (1963).
61. Thomas Irwin Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, 6-7 (1970), cited
within Comedy III Productions v. Saderup, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 133 (2001).
62. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Patricia R. Stembridge,
Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment Protection For The Fringe, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 907,
927-29 (2000); Frederick Schauer, The Role Of The People In First Amendment Theory, 74
Calif. L. Rev. 761, 773-78 (1986).
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best interest of those seeking the truth that aliens be allowed to
participate and freely express themselves. At least a portion of
the ideas aliens convey may be true or contribute to the distilla-
tion of the truth. The source of the idea is wholly irrelevant. In
the context of foreign affairs, aliens may even possess "superior"
ideas because of their access to information obtained by keeping in
touch with friends and family in their home countries.
The second philosophical rational for free expression, self-
governance, also supports the notion that aliens should freely ex-
press themselves. The premise behind this theory is that, in order
to govern effectively in a democracy, people need information to
make wise and educated decisions." Under this rationale, there
are two reasons that aliens should be allowed to freely express
themselves. First, for United States citizens to make wise choices
in self-governance, they need information to help them form deci-
sions on matters such as foreign relations and policy, even domes-
tic matters, where a new perspective might be needed. Second,
many lawfully admitted aliens seek to become U.S. citizens
through naturalization. At some point, they will need to be in-
formed because they will become a part of the self-governing body.
Further, they will need to be informed and must be able to par-
ticipate in order to make the decision to become a United States
citizen.
With regard to the third philosophical justification for free ex-
pression, self-realization and autonomy, aliens again should have
the same right to freely express themselves. Self-realization fo-
cuses on the fact that there is a relationship between free expres-
sion and personal fulfillment." Those living in this country,
whether aliens or citizens, need information to know what possi-
bilities exist for them in life. United States immigration law, in
one sense, seems to support this view. Aliens who are persecuted
in their home countries because of religion, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or because of their political opinion can seek
and receive refuge in the United States.65 In their home countries,
63. See generally John 0. McGinnis, The Once And Future Property-Based Vision Of
The First Amendment, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 49, 119 (1996); G. Edward White, The First
Amendment Comes Of Age: The Emergence Of Free Speech In Twentieth- Century America,
95 Mich. L. Rev. 299, 326-27, (1996); Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech And Intellectual Values,
92 Yale L.J. 438, 439-40 (1983).
64. R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are As Hard (And As Easy) As They Are,
68 Tenn. L. Rev. 335, 340-41, 346-67 (2001); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4
(1998); Martin H. Redish, The Value Of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 594-96 (1982).
65. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42) (2002).
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these aliens were unlikely to achieve personal autonomy because
of their repression. However, they are likely to reach such a goal
in the United States. Also, as mentioned above, aliens need to
freely participate so that they have adequate information to decide
whether to naturalize or not.
The freedoms of speech and association treasured by United
States citizens is extended to aliens present in the United States.
This has been established by case law and supported by discussion
of the philosophical background of the First Amendment. The
next section will demonstrate that, unlike United States citizens,
aliens' First Amendment rights are vulnerable to attack in the
context of deportation proceedings.
III. ALTHOUGH ALIENS' SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONS ARE
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN GENERAL, THEIR RIGHTS
ARE NOT PROTECTED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF DEPORTATION
PROCEEDINGS.
Deportation is considered by the Supreme Court to be a civil
proceeding.66 Therefore, many of the protections afforded in
criminal proceedings are not applicable.67 At the same time,
though, the Court recognizes the cruelty imposed by deportation.
The Bridges II Court declared that:
The impact of deportation upon the life of an alien is often as
great if not greater than the imposition of a criminal sentence.
A deported alien may lose his family, his friends and his live-
lihood forever. Return to his native land may result in pov-
erty, persecution and even death.68
Deportation is "the removal or sending back of an alien to the
country from which he came because his presence is deemed in-
consistent with the public welfare, and without any punishment
being imposed or contemplated." 9 The actual grounds of deporta-
tion are located within Title 8 of the United States Code.7° The
requirements that are in place are derived from the protections
66. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594.
67. Id. For example, in this case, the Court held that to strike down the law as retroac-
tive and violative of the ex post facto provision of the Constitution would require the Court
to alter its view that deportation proceedings are civil in nature. Id.
68. Bridges 11, 326 U.S. at 164.
69. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 438 (6th ed. 1990).
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2002).
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guaranteed by the due process clause and are provided for by
agency regulation.71 Generally, the INS must provide to the alien
both notice72 and a hearing.73
An immigration judge oversees the removal proceedings. His or
her authority is limited to determining removability of aliens, to
making decisions that include orders of removal, to determining
applications, and to withholding removal.74 The immigration
judge's actions are to be consistent with applicable laws and regu-
lations. 75  During removal proceedings, the immigration judge
must advise the alien of his or her rights, including the right to an
attorney at no cost to the government, the right to examine the
evidence against him or her, the right to present evidence on his
76or her behalf, and the right to cross-examine witnesses.
In the removal proceeding, INS bears the burden of proving that
an alien is removable.77 First, INS must establish that the person
charged with removal is an alien without claim to U.S. citizen-
ship." Second, INS is required to prove by "clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent is deportable as charged."79 While
this standard is higher than that required in most civil proceed-
ings, it is far from the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
used in criminal trials. Further, at any time during the proceed-
ing, INS may substitute new grounds of deportation for the
grounds the alien was originally charged with or additional new
grounds."0
After INS has met its burden, the alien has an opportunity to
present evidence on his or her behalf which may prove that he or
she is not removable, or that the alien is eligible for requested
benefits or privileges that should be granted.8' If the alien proves
that he or she is eligible for benefits or privileges, and the evi-
dence also appears to indicate that grounds for mandatory denial
71. See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at
597; Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 581, 586 n.9; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. at 152-53.
72. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2002).
73. See id. § 240.10. In general, 8 C.F.R. § 240 (2001) regulates the proceedings to
determine removability of aliens in the United States.
74. 8 C.F.R. § 240.1.
75. Id.
76. 8 C.F.R. § 240.10(a)(1)-(4).
77. 8 C.F.R. § 240.8(a).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 8 C.F.R. § 240.10(e).
81. 8 C.F.R. § 240.8(d).
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are applicable, the burden is on the alien to prove, by a prepon-
derance, that the grounds for denial do not apply."
Once the immigration judge has heard all the evidence, he or
she will issue a decision.83 The decision should include a finding
as to whether the alien was deportable and reasons for grant-
ing/denying requests for benefits and privileges.8 If the immigra-
tion judge orders the alien removed, the alien may appeal the de-
cision within thirty days to the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA.").8
The BIA is responsible for reviewing and deciding appeals from
immigration judges' decisions." It issues its decisions in the form
of written opinions that set precedent, binding immigration judges
and employees of INSY. However, the Attorney General may direct
the BIA to refer cases to him or her and the Attorney General's
decision on the matter becomes binding in the same way.88
Although immigration judges and the BIA make decisions that
seriously impact the lives of aliens, immigration judges and the
BIA lack the authority to decide whether a ground of deportation
is constitutional.89 In the Matter of Church Scientology Interna-
tional,"° the BIA acknowledged this limitation." "Of course, the
Service cannot pass upon the constitutionality of the statute it
administers. Nevertheless, we can address questions relating to
the constitutionality of its application."" In other words, the BIA
can determine whether INS violated an alien's right to due process
by not providing the alien notice as required by regulation. On
the other hand, the BIA cannot determine whether a ground of
deportation, as written, violates an alien's First Amendment
rights because the BIA is the body charged with administering the
law.
Recognizing that the deportation proceeding is not a forum in
which an alien can challenge a ground of deportation as violating
his or her First Amendment rights, where can an alien make such
82. Id.
83. 8 C.F.R. § 240.12(a).
84. Id.
85. 8 C.F.R. § 240.15.
86. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(1)-(3).
87. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g).
88. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h).
89. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I. & N. Dec. 593, 603 (1988).
90. 19 I. & N. Dec. 593, 603 (1988).




challenge? Aliens ordered removed may seek review of the final
order of removal within thirty days after the final order was is-
sued in the court of appeal, with jurisdiction over the location
where the immigration judge completed the removal proceeding.93
Unless the court of appeals orders the alien's removal stayed, fil-
ing a petition for review of the final order of deportation does not
prevent the Attorney General from removing the alien and essen-
tially mooting the issue.94 The court of appeals is limited to decid-
ing the petition based on the administrative record on which the
final order was based.95 Further, the findings of fact made by the
BIA "are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary."96 Review of all questions of
law and fact by the court of appeal, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, is available
only when there is a final order of removal.97
United States citizens can challenge statutes for being over-
broad under the First Amendment because an overbroad statute
may chill protected First Amendment rights.9" Citizens can seek
injunctive and declaratory relief in certain situations. But does
this mean an alien can seek to enjoin or restrain the operation of
the grounds of deportation because it violates the First Amend-
ment? Unfortunately, Title 8 of the U.S. Code denies aliens the
same opportunity when addressing grounds of deportation. To
challenge his/her ground of deportation, an alien must have been
found deportable under a final order of removal, after exhausting
all administrative remedies.99 Title 8 specifically states:
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or the identity
of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other
than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority
to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part 4
of this subchapter, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than
with respect to the application of such provisions to an indi-
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)-(2) (2002). Also, to appeal, the alien cannot be ordered re-
moved based on certain criminal grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2002).
94. See id. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B).
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
98. See Broadrick v Oklahoma 413 U.S. 601 (1973); U.S. v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, (1960);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2002).
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vidual alien against whom proceedings under such part have
been initiated.'00
The result of this limitation is that aliens may forego otherwise
protected speech and association because they cannot challenge
grounds of deportation without risking practically everything. In
the current climate, speech and association such as meeting with
fellow Palestinians to picket over the present crisis in the Middle
East might be cause to remove an alien if he or she is suspected of
engaging in terrorist activity. An alien may firmly believe that
United States policy is wrong and wish to speak out. However the
individual will likely question whether speaking out may result in
losing the life he/she has built in the United States. Perhaps out
of fear of being returned to a place of persecution or a place of war
and hostility, the alien will frequently choose not to speak. This
robs society, consisting of citizens and aliens, of information that
could be useful in determining foreign policy of the United States
during this Middle East crisis and information citizens could use
when choosing an elected official.
It has been established that removal or deportation proceedings
do not provide aliens with an opportunity to challenge their re-
moval on constitutional grounds. Left open is the question of
whether any ground of deportation is unconstitutional. This is a
serious question because, as discussed, aliens' ability to challenge
portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act are very limited.
In the next section, the ground of deportation related to terrorism
is examined to determine if it is unconstitutional because it vio-
lates the First Amendment rights of aliens.
IV. 8 USC § 1227(A)(4)(B), AS AMENDED BY THE USA PATRIOT ACT,
VIOLATES ALIENS' RIGHTS TO FREE EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION,
AS PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
Aliens, whether lawfully or unlawfully in the United States, can
be removed under a number of grounds of deportation.'0 ' Most of
these grounds focus on conduct engaged in by the alien. One ex-
ample of such conduct is when an alien votes in a federal election,
which is prohibited under the law because only United States citi-
zens are permitted to vote in federal elections; 2 another example
100. See id. at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1).
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
102. 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(6).
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is when an alien becomes an overstay, meaning the alien re-
mained in the United States beyond the time period he or she was
admitted."3 The ground focusing on terrorist activity goes beyond
conduct alone, though. This ground states: "Any alien who has
engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in
any terrorist activity (as defined in section 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) of this
title) is deportable." °4 The fact that there is a ground of deporta-
tion for terrorism is not new. °5 What is new is the current climate
and hysteria under which this ground may be applied.
On its surface, this ground of deportation appears to be reason-
able and benign. However, when examining the definition of "en-
gage in terrorist activity," upon which this ground relies, it be-
comes less evident. This definition is located within the section of
law that addresses grounds of inadmissibility of aliens who are
applying for admission into the United States.' Applying for ad-
mission means that the alien is just arriving in the United States,
perhaps at a port of entry on the Canadian/Mexican border or on
an international flight.' 7 An immigration officer will inspect the
alien and determine whether or not to admit the alien."8 At this
time, it is the alien's burden to satisfy the immigration officer that
no ground of inadmissibility prevents the admission of the alien
into the United States. 09
Aliens' rights at the border are extremely limited, although
there is an exception for returning resident aliens."0 These appli-
cants for admission have some due process rights. Otherwise,
however, much of the Bill of Rights and Constitution are inappli-
cable to them, including the rights protected by the First Amend-
ment."' Since these applicants are not within the boundaries of
the United States and usually lack sufficient ties, these applicants
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C).
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
105. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1250 after its amendment
by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (September 30, 1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996); Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-416, 108 Stat. 1796 (September 13, 1994); Immigra-
tion Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, Stat. (November 29, 1990).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2002).
107. See id. § 1101(a)(4).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
110. Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596.
111. Id. at 598 n.5 (1953) (citing concurring opinion of Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
161 (1945)).
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are not recognized as "the people" protected by the Constitution.112
Practically speaking, it makes sense to have stringent require-
ments in place before admitting an alien. This is the best oppor-
tunity to prevent an individual who may become a threat from
entering the United States. It is the burden of the applicant to
show that he or she is not and will not become a threat.
After admission, the scene changes. Although not citizens,
aliens become vested with certain rights when admitted, including
the rights protected by the First Amendment."' Another dramatic
change occurs. In order to remove an alien, INS has the burden of
proving, with clear and convincing evidence, that the alien is re-
movable."' But this does not save the ground of deportation. It
still suffers from substantial overbreadth."'
Specific sections of the definition relied upon by this ground of
deportation are overbroad because they include, as reasons for
removing an alien, conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Additionally, this ground has not been interpreted in such a way
to "save" it by limiting it to what is permissible under the Consti-
tution.116 Future interpretation is not likely to change this under-
standing, either, because the definition is doing double-duty by
supporting a ground of inadmissibility that places the burden on
the alien and a ground of deportation, which places the burden
upon the INS. Further, after September 11, 2001, terrorism has
become a catch phrase for that "evil" that is being fought by the
United States, similar to the communism and subversive speech of
old."7 For instance, in response to September 11, 2001, INS de-
tained many aliens for indefinite periods of time, primarily be-
cause of their ethnicity and religious beliefs." 8 Part of the reason
behind this detainment was that the U.S. did not know who the
112. U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). Applying definition of who
"the people" are from this opinion. Id. at 265.
113. See supra note 46 and note 47 and accompanying text.
114. 8 C.F.R.. § 240.8(a) (2002).
115. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999).
116. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). President Bush
signed this bill into law on 10/26/2001.
117. Compare with Dennis, 341 U.S. 494. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927);
Gitlow v. NY, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams, 250 U.S. 616; Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Schenk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919); and Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535
(S.D.N.Y 1917).
118. Testimony of Ali Al-Maqtari On Due Process Before the Committee on the Judiciary




"terrorists" were in the United States, only what ethnic and reli-
gious background they might come from.
The challenged definition, "engages in terrorist activity," states
in relevant part:
As used in this chapter, the term "engage in terrorist activity"
means, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organi-
zation-
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for-
(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or
(vi)(II); or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III),
unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know,
and should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation
would further the organization's terrorist activity;" 9
For an alien to be found deportable under this portion of the
definition, the alien needs to first seek money or other things of
value.' Second, the money or things of value must be obtained for
either a terrorist activity, a terrorist organization as designated by
8 U.S.C. §1189, a terrorist organization as designated by either
the Secretary of State or the Attorney General and published in
the Federal Register, or a group of at least two individuals that
engage in any number of activities, including providing material
support for a terrorist organization.121 It is this last portion that is
of real concern because all that is required is for an alien to en-
gage in activity with one other person, regardless of whether the
two were actually working in concert. In addition, if INS proves
that the alien solicited funds or things of value for a group of at
least two individuals engaging in proscribed activities, the alien
can only claim lack of knowledge as a defense to being removed if
he can prove that he did not know and should not reasonably have
known that his or her solicitation would further the terrorist or-
ganization's terrorist activity. This effectively shifts the burden to
the alien. 2
This deportation ground implicates speech because it involves
fundraising, which is often a form of expression, or, at a minimum,
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2002).
120. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(aa).
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(LV)(bb)-(cc).
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc).
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is often intertwined with speech and association.'23 The definition
fails to fully take into account whether the alien's solicitation was
for protected speech or unlawful activity. If a citizen contributes
money or donates property to a religious group, to a political
group, or to an artist, that citizen has expressed his or her support
for the cause that the group or artist works towards. Generally,
citizens are free to do this. The same should be true for aliens
who are lawfully in the United States. But because of the defini-
tion above, it is not the same for aliens.
To illustrate the overbreadth of the newly revised ground of de-
portation, a hypothetical will be considered that tests a portion of
the definition "engages in terrorist activity." The hypothetical in-
volves an alien engaging in protected conduct, conduct similar to
that quoted at the beginning of this comment.124 Consider the fol-
lowing. Emanon is a Palestinian and lawful permanent resident
of the United States. He wants the United States to support the
Palestinian side of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Finding a
group of friends with similar goals, he pickets with his friends
outside of Congress with signs like, "Stop Israeli Murder, Support
Yasser Arafat!!" While picketing, Emanon and his friends hand
out pamphlets providing information about the cause from the
Palestinian perspective. These pamphlets also ask for money in
support of this cause. Emanon is only supporting a cause he be-
lieves in and he does not know that that his friends are linked to
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP"), one of
the groups designated by the Secretary of State as being a terror-
ist organization."' Likewise, Emanon does not know that the
money received while picketing may be used to purchase things of
value to be sent to Palestine, possibly to support militant activities
or maybe only for humanitarian activities, such as for the pur-
chase of blankets. However, that same day, an Immigration offi-
cer arrests Emanon and his friends based on the ground of depor-
tation incorporating the definition quoted above. Is Emanon de-
portable because he "solicited funds.. .for a terrorist organiza-
tion?" 26
123. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
124. This is only one possible example of overbreadth within this definition and ground of
deportation.
125. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55112 (Oct. 8, 1999).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(TV)(bb) (2002).
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Examine what Emanon actually did. He delivered his message,
his speech, in two ways. First, he picketed, seeking to raise public
awareness of the crisis between Israel and Palestinians. Specifi-
cally, he picketed in front of Congress, where those chosen by the
people to govern the United States are located. Second, he handed
out pamphlets. These pamphlets provided information that read-
ers could use and consider when making decisions regarding
whom to elect. It would assist them in considering candidates'
view regarding American policy towards the Middle East. The
request for monetary support was only incidental to Emanon's
activity and he believed the money was being raised to support
more activity or expression of this kind. Unfortunately, if INS
proves that Emanon solicited funds for a terrorist organization
such as the PFLP, he will be removed from the United States,
against his will. His only hope is that after a final order of depor-
tation is issued, he can convince an Article III judge, through a
writ of habeas corpus27 or petition per chapter 158 of 28 U.S.C.,'28
that as applied to him this ground of deportation violated his
rights as protected by the First Amendment.
If INS fails to prove that Emanon supported the PFLP, it may
be able to prove that he supported a group of two individuals or
more who were "planning a terrorist activity."'29 After all, where
did the group picket? It picketed outside of Congress, a potential
target for a terrorist attack. How is Emanon supposed to know
what activities his friends are planning? In the end, it will be very
difficult for Emanon to show that he did not know and should not
reasonably have known that the solicitation would further terror-
ist activity. Based on the above hypothetical, why even risk being
deported? Why support a cause and risk losing everything? The
broad definition of "engages in terrorist activity" therefore chills
speech and association. The chilling effect is serious too, because
it implicates many of the reasons for the First Amendment, like
self-governance, the search for truth, and self-autonomy.
Other sections of the definition "engages in terrorist activity"
implicate similar First Amendment interests. Part V of 8 U.S.C.
§1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) renders an alien deportable for soliciting indi-
viduals to become members of an alleged terrorist organization.1
0
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2002).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2344.
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(II) (2002).
130. See id. § 112(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V).
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Since a terrorist organization can be made up of only "a group of
two or more individuals, whether organized or not,"3' inviting ac-
quaintances or friends or even a family member for coffee could
later turn out to be a reason to deport an alien. This definition
requires someone to know so much about the background of fam-
ily, friends, and acquaintances that it discourages meeting and
discussions between aliens. Otherwise, how would aliens know
the persons with whom they met were not going to later engage in
terrorist activity?
Part VI of 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B) makes an alien deportable for
committing an act that the alien knows, or reasonably should
know, affords material support:
(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, affords material support, including a safe house,
transportation, communications, funds, transfers of funds or
other material financial benefit, false documentation or iden-
tification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radio-
logical weapons), explosives, or training-
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist ac-
tivity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or
(vi)(II); or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III),
unless the actor can demonstrate that he did not know, and
should not reasonably have known, that the act would further
the organization's terrorist activity.3 2
Many ordinary activities, like driving a cousin to a friend's
house or to a demonstration outside of Congress, could become a
basis for removal. This is due to the portion of the definition im-
mediately above, the alien may have provided transportation to
someone he or she reasonably should have known planned to en-
gage in terrorist activity. The next time an alien's friend visits his
home, the alien will need to consider whether, by allowing his
friend to use his internet service or phone, he may helping his
friend engage in terrorist activity. The issue in this case is
131. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
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whether the alien is providing "communications" to someone he
reasonably should know plans to commit a terrorist activity.
Based on these examples, it is evident that other parts of this
definition relied upon by the ground of deportation are also over-
broad.
Sadly, current immigration law promotes a scheme which em-
phasizes efficiency in removing aliens as quickly as possible over
recognition of aliens' constitutional rights. As a result, aliens'
ability to challenge this ground of deportation is virtually non-
existent, only increasing the potential chilling effect on speech and
association. Since aliens are unable to challenge the ground of
deportation prior to engaging in the expressive conduct that they
believe is protected by the First Amendment, in order to challenge
it, aliens must actually engage in the speech and expressive con-
duct, risking deportation. 3 ' Who would reasonably risk every-
thing to test this ground of deportation? Further, what does this
legislative scheme say about the United States? Is it truly dedi-
cated to the ideals expounded in the First Amendment? At least
when judged in reference to the recent anti-terrorist legislation,
which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act, the answer
must be no.
Finally, one could analyze this ground of deportation and the
definition it relies upon to see if it would pass scrutiny under the
standard set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio."' The Ku Klux Klan is
an organization that has only limited support for its ideas and its
members have, at times, engaged in violent activities. But the Ku
Klux Klan and its members are allowed to speak and associate so
long as they do not cross the line into immediate and likely viola-
tion of the law.' The same should be true of the speech and asso-
ciation of aliens, even when the aliens associate with groups alleg-
edly linked to supporting terrorism, like the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. As long as aliens do not engage in lawless
conduct or have not crossed the line into likely and immediate vio-
lation of the law, they should not be deportable. Further, they
should not be prohibited from soliciting funds or new members
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(9).
134. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). "[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law viola-
tion except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id.
135. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (1969).
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who share similar beliefs. It is the acts of violence or terrorism
that are the concern, not their speech and association.
V. SINCE THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF ALIENS ARE VIOLATED
BY 8 U.S.C. §1227A(4)(B), SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE TO
CORRECT THIS GROUND OF DEPORTATION SO THAT IT COMPLIES
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
The ultimate purpose of this ground of deportation and the defi-
nition it relies upon appears to be the prevention of actual acts of
terrorism by removing those aliens who are members of groups
that may meet, plan, and acquire materials to commit acts of ter-
rorism. This purpose can be accomplished without infringing on
aliens' First Amendment rights, however, because alternatives
exist that would allow the United States to deport aliens for ter-
rorist activity and comply with the First Amendment. These al-
ternatives include revising the ground of deportation and the
definition it relies upon, utilizing the ground of deportation for
crimes involving moral turpitude, revising the Immigration and
Nationality Act to allow aliens to challenge the terrorism ground
on its face, and allowing aliens ordered removed under this ground
to present new evidence if the court of appeals, in its discretion,
deems it appropriate.
A. Revising The Definition Of "Engages In Terrorist Activity."
The first step that should be taken to correct the ground of de-
portation based on terrorism is to use the definition of "engages in
terrorist activity" in its current form only within the grounds of
inadmissibility and cease to use it to support a ground of deporta-
tion. As the ground of deportation is now written, it refers the
reader to the definition of "engages in terrorist activity" contained
in the grounds of inadmissibility.136 It states: "Any alien who has
engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in
any terrorist activity (as defined in section 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) of this
title) is deportable."137 But this legislative scheme, by relying on
the definition within the grounds of inadmissibility, fails to take
into account the fact that aliens already within the United States
possess First Amendment rights that aliens who are seeking ad-
mission into the United States lack. As a result of these First
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2002).
137. See id. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2002).
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Amendment rights, a different definition is needed to support the
ground of deportation for terrorist activity.
A second step that should be taken is to include within the
ground of deportation a definition of "engages in terrorist activity"
that does comply with the First Amendment. This could be
achieved by using the same definition of "engages in terrorist ac-
tivity" located within the grounds of inadmissibility and revising
it. For instance, here is one portion of the definition, "engages in
terrorist activity," as it is today:
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for-
(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or
(vi)(II); or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III),
unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know,
and should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation
would further the organization's terrorist activity;
1 8
As written now, the quoted section above allows aliens to be de-
ported because of raising money or things of value for a terrorist
organization described in clause (vi)(III), meaning a group of two
or more individuals who engage in certain activities including the
material support of a terrorist organization, 139 unless the aliens
can show that they did not know and should not reasonably have
known that the solicitation would further a terrorist organiza-
tion. 4' This definition is overbroad because, as discussed earlier,
it captures a wide range of activities that are protected by the
First Amendment. The portion that addresses groups of two or
more should be completely removed from the definition that the
ground of deportation would rely on. Instead, it should be
amended to read:
The term "engage in terrorist activity" means, in an individ-
ual capacity or as a member of an organization-
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for--
(aa) a terrorist activity;
138. 8. U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
139. 8. U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
140. 8. U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (V)-(VI)(2002).
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(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or
(vi)(II);"4
By omitting (cc), this revision permits those aliens who solicited
money for recognized terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda to be deported
while allowing aliens who exercised their First Amendment rights
by supporting friends and relatives, not knowing that they were
engaged in terrorism, to remain. Further, since aliens are still
deportable for engaging in terrorist activity, the friends and rela-
tives engaging in terrorism, if aliens would still be deportable.
This is but one example of the many revisions that are necessary
to bring this definition into compliance with the First Amend-
ment.
Finally, Congress should refer to the standard set forth in
Brandenburg v. Ohio when rewriting this ground of deportation.'
Although the Court considers deportation to be a civil action, it
has recognized the severity of deportation.' The majority of the
grounds of deportation in 8 U.S.C. §1227 focus on conduct of aliens
that is unlawful.
The ground used for terrorism should not be any different.
Where the aliens' activities are directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and their actions are likely to incite or
produce such action, nothing should prevent the United States
from deporting these aliens. Based on this, the definition, "en-
gages in terrorist activity" should be further amended to read:
The term "engage in terrorist activity" means, in an individ-
ual capacity or as a member of an organization-
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for-
(aa) a terrorist activity; or,
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or
(vi)(II),"' when one knows or reasonably should have known
that his or her solicitation for funds or other things of value is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.
141. 8. U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
142. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(2002).
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Additionally, the INS should bear the burden of proving that
aliens knew or reasonably should have known that their activity
could result in violence, instead of aliens proving that did not
know and reasonably should not have known.
4
B. Utilizing the Ground of Deportation for Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude.
In addition to relying on the ground of deportation for terrorism
to remove aliens, it may also be possible to remove aliens who
have engaged in terrorist activity using the ground of deportation
that makes aliens removable for the committing of crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude.146 It seems probable that aliens who engage
in terrorist activity have conspired and solicited others to commit
crimes. Therefore, if these aliens were prosecuted and convicted
for these crimes by using the criminal laws the United States al-
ready has in place, like conspiracy47 and solicitation,' the aliens
could be deportable for committing crimes involving moral turpi-
tude. One drawback to this approach, however, is that not every
alien engaged in terrorist activity may have committed crimes.
Using the ground of deportation for crimes involving moral turpi-
tude only removes those that have committed crimes and been
convicted for those crimes.
C. Revising the Immigration And Nationality Act to Allow Aliens
to Challenge the Terrorism Ground on its Face and Allow
Aliens Ordered Removed Under This Ground to Present New
Evidence Should the Court Of Appeals, in its Discretion,
Deems it Appropriate.
Despite the potential utility of the ground of deportation for
crimes involving moral turpitude, it is still necessary to have a
ground of deportation for terrorism because not all terrorists may
commit crimes. As a result, some aliens engaged in terrorist activ-
ity may only be removable on a terrorist based ground of deporta-
tion. Even if the definition of "engages in terrorist activity" relied
upon by the ground of deportation is thoroughly revised, these cor-
rections may not fully resolve all conflicts with the First Amend-
145. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(2002).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 372 (2002).
148. See id. § 373 (2002).
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ment. For this reason, it is necessary that the federal courts play
an active role in the removal process in order to provide an oppor-
tunity for judicial review to aliens so that the ground of deporta-
tion, as applied to them, does not violate their First Amendment
rights.
At present, aliens' ability to challenge final orders of removal is
very limited.'49 Per the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien
may challenge a final order of removal to the court of appeals,
however, the court of appeals is restrained from hearing any new
evidence beyond that contained in the record from the administra-
tive proceeding.5 ° This prevents an alien from being able to chal-
lenge his or her final order on constitutional grounds because he
or she cannot present evidence during the administrative hearing
demonstrating why the ground of deportation is violative of the
First Amendment. As discussed previously, both the INS and the
BIA lack the authority to decide whether a ground of deportation
complies with the Constitution.' Therefore, evidence that would
demonstrate that the ground, as applied, violates the First
Amendment rights of the alien ordered removed is not likely to be
presented. To correct this, the Immigration and Nationality Act
should be revised to allow new evidence to be presented if the
court, in its discretion, deems it necessary or pertinent in its re-
view of the final order of removal of an alien by INS.
An additional option that should be considered is to allow the
ground of deportation to be challenged on its face as overbroad.'52
This would permit the court to review the revised ground of depor-
tation, prior to aliens' risking removal by engaging in speech and
association, to determine if it would chill aliens' First Amendment
rights. If the court found it to be overbroad, there would be other
opportunities to further revise this ground until it was in compli-
ance with the First Amendment. A benefit of this approach is that
once cases have held that the ground complies with the First
Amendment, especially if those cases reached the Supreme Court,
the danger of it being facially overbroad is minimized. Final adju-
dication on this matter would also allow deportation of such aliens
to occur more rapidly because questions as to whether the ground
149. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. The current Immigration and National-




was overbroad would be resolved and not require further litiga-
tion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the events of September 11, 2001 and the continuing
crisis in the Middle East have made "terrorism" the hot topic of
today, the United States, as a nation must not lose sight of the
values it is fighting for, especially the values the First Amend-
ment is meant to protect, such as the freedom of speech and the
freedom to associate. While aliens are present in the United
States as either its guests or as permanent residents, the First
Amendment protects their right to speak and to associate. As a
result, the Immigration and Nationality Act, specifically the
ground of deportation for terrorism contained within it, must be
amended to recognize aliens' First Amendment rights and to cease
violation of those rights.
The ground of deportation for terrorism can be amended and
still accomplish its goal of removing those aliens who are a danger
to society. This can be achieved by providing the ground of depor-
tation with a separate and unique definition of "engages in terror-
ist activity" independent from the definition used within the
grounds of inadmissibility. The definition of "engages in terrorist
activity" should also omit those portions that relate to "two or
more people" soliciting funds, members, etc. In addition, the defi-
nition should include an element requiring INS to prove that the
aliens' conduct was directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and that the conduct was likely to incite or produce
such action. By requiring this element, it is less likely that those
engaging in mere speech and association would become deport-
able.
Finally, to be certain that changes made to the ground of depor-
tation for terrorism correct the violations to aliens' First Amend-
ment rights, the Supreme Court should play its usual role in re-
viewing governmental actions and determining if those actions
violate the Constitution. This means that aliens should be able to
challenge the ground of deportation on its face if it potentially
chills their speech and association. It also means that if an alien
is ordered removed, he or she should have an opportunity to seek
judicial review of the agency's decision. During that review, the
alien should be allowed to present new evidence when appropri-
ate. If these changes are made, not only will the United States be
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able to pursue its war on terrorism, it will stay true to itself and
the ideals the First Amendment was meant to protect.

